President Bola Tinubu has flown with one wing of the naira-for-petroleum transaction bird by asking the Nigeria National Petroleum Company Limited to sell petroleum to local refineries, including Dangote Refinery, in naira. This may lead to the renaming of Nigeria’s currency as the petro-naira.

Of course, the deal is not properly implemented. Some saboteurs within the NNPCL and its ecosystem, who are working in the interest of foreign paymasters, have made sure that it will not be properly implemented so that the President will be forced to abandon it.

Even with the sabotage, Nigerians cannot deny the advantages of the policy as they have recently witnessed regular announcements of steady reductions in the price of petrol by Dangote Refinery, which is compelling NNPCL to reduce the price of its (albeit) imported petrol.

The other wing of the naira-for-petroleum deal, which is the real McCoy, is the sale of petroleum to foreign buyers who will be expected to first buy naira from the Central Bank of Nigeria, through approved protocols, and then use the acquired naira to buy petroleum from NNPCL.

By this novel payment protocol, which North American and West European economic interests will fight with weapons, including insurrection, Nigeria will still receive the convertible currencies, and the naira will also return to the Nigerian financial system.

So, Nigeria will still have the convertible currency in its foreign reserves, which can always be used to pay Nigeria’s foreign obligations and pay for goods imported by citizens and corporate organisations. You could say that Nigeria will be able to eat its cake and have it.

Soon after he was sworn in for his second term as President, Donald Trump openly threatened 100 per cent import tariffs if BRICS nations—Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa and five other associate countries—replace the US dollar with any other currency as the reserve currency.

His words: “We are going to require a commitment from these seemingly hostile countries that they will neither create a new BRICS currency, nor back any other currency to replace the mighty US dollar, or they will face 100 per cent tariffs.”

A video of an unidentified Kenyan that is making the rounds on the internet explains that the current international economic and financial architecture is made to serve the interests of the probably 50 or so nations that set it up. That is not surprising.

For sure, former colonial countries that were not part of the deliberations of the metropolitan powers should not expect the United Nations, the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund to serve their interests.

But the best way to go is for Nigeria to find a way to join BRICS as a full member, and not as an associate so that the acronym will change to BRINCS, as some had speculated in the past before some of Nigeria’s previous presidents chickened out.

What are the advantages of this move? The metropolitan economies, including Uncle Sam, will think very deeply before taking any steps against the economy of BRINCS. For their support for Ukraine in the war against Russia, Germany and Italy were compelled to pay for Russian gas with the Russian ruble.

The economies of the BRINCS nations should be on the north side of 40 per cent of the global economy, and their population, more than 55 per cent of the world’s population, cannot be disregarded by the International Monopoly Capital that is perennially looking for investment markets.

It will be a good win for Nigeria if the President can find the courage to implement this policy. But by far, its most important advantage is that as demand for the naira increases, the naira will gain strength. As every Economics 101 university student knows, the law of demand and supply promises to raise the price of a commodity when there is an increased demand for it.

Another advantage, albeit in the long term, can be achieved if the Minister for Industries, Trade and Investments joins “hardknocks” corporate players from the bricks-and-mortar sector of the economy with the intellectual PhDs economic advisers to devise a template to revitalise the comatose manufacturing factories of Nigeria.

The expected increase in local production of consumer goods will eliminate, or significantly reduce, the need for Nigerians to import such consumer goods and the need to procure foreign currencies to pay for the imports.

This reduction on foreign convertible needs will significantly reduce the pressure on the naira and make it even stronger. In any case, the current financial and payment structures of the world are not written in concrete. They were devised to serve the interests of the Western metropolitan economies.

If this structural pressure is removed, the prices of consumer goods will crash and the high cost of living will drastically fall, to the advantage of poor Nigerian citizens who are still struggling daily with the negative impacts of the removal of subsidy from petrol, electricity and the naira.

Also, if the manufacturing firms and the agricultural farms can be more productive, they will be able to pay higher tax revenues to the government and reduce Nigeria’s dependence on foreign loans and the sale of petroleum to finance its annual budgets.

The President, who has belled the cat by ordering the sale of petroleum by NNPCL to local refineries in naira, should go the whole hog and sell the commodity to foreign buyers for naira. He must seize the moment in the interest of Nigeria’s economy.

After all, American President Trump is already disrupting old landmarks of given economic assumptions and payment protocols of the world. Every country should be able to play the game of disruption. Who dares, wins, according to an old saw.

If the international monopoly capital responds with venom, as is to be expected, Nigeria should respond with bolder steps. You would have observed that when President Trump imposed a 145 per cent tariff on Chinese imports, China retaliated with a 125 per cent tariff on American goods.

Soon after, both nations, knowing that they need each other, were compelled to tone down their rhetoric and issue a joint statement declaring a 90-day suspension of the tariff war, to further explore a more sanguine approach to resolving their trade differences.

The suspension of hitherto uncharitable words against each other shows a degree of mutual respect and recognition of the strength of each other’s economy. Everyone knows that the two economies are intertwined, even if they do not openly acknowledge it.

Let no one lose sight of the fact that China Inc. and America’s Wall Street are opposite sides of the same coin, economic Siamese twins that have been in business even before the days of the anti-imperialist and anti-Christian Boxer Revolution in China between 1899 and 1901.

If these economic policy suggestions are diligently followed, Nigeria should have a steady inflow of convertible currencies, strengthen the naira, drive higher revenue into the government’s exchequer, reduce debts and make more consumer items available to Nigerians—in the medium to long-term.

Though Uncle Tom economic experts of Nigeria will argue vehemently for the given economic theories that serve the interest of the West only, President Tinubu and his economic team should look beyond them and do everything necessary to right the unilaterally given economic wrongs done by the West.

As it struggles with the consequences of its poor handling of the rash of military coups in the West African region, the leadership of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) appears to have run out of ideas and creativity in search of an effective solution.

By their decision to use military force to restore constitutional order in Niger following the army takeover of government in that country on 26 July 2023, and the sweeping sanctions imposed on coup plotters in Mali, Guinea, Burkina Faso and Niger, including travel and flight bans, ECOWAS leaders should have known that they were on slippery grounds.

In its 50 years of existence, the regional bloc is better known for acquitting itself credibly in conflict prevention, management, and resolution, especially ending the civil wars in Liberia and Sierra Leone and effectively restoring constitutional order in member States after military coups.

While Article 45 of the Supplementary Protocol on Democracy and Good Governance 2001 permits the Mediation and Security Council to apply measures including sanctions in the event of an unconstitutional change of government, the Authority of Heads of State and Government had always maintained a principled stance in deploying a combination of tools/strategies - diplomacy and tough decisions, where necessary, in tackling conflicts.

Article 45.1 states: “In the event that democracy is abruptly brought to an end by any means or where there is massive violation of Human Rights in a member State, ECOWAS may impose sanctions on the State concerned.” 

45.2. explains: “The sanctions which shall be decided by the Authority may take the following forms, in increasing order of severity:

• Refusal to support the candidates presented by the member State concerned for elective posts in international organisations

• Refusal to organise ECOWAS meetings in the Member State concerned

• Suspension of the member State concerned from all ECOWAS decision-making bodies. During the period of the suspension, the member State concerned shall be obliged to pay its dues for the period.

45.3. During the period of suspension, ECOWAS shall continue to monitor, encourage and support the efforts being made by the suspended member State to return to normalcy and constitutional order.

45.4. On the recommendation of the Mediation and Security Council, a decision may be taken at the appropriate time to proceed as stipulated in Article 45 of the Protocol Relating to the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peace-Keeping and Security 1999.

On Restoration of Political Authority, this Article stipulates: “In situations where the authority of government is absent or has been seriously eroded, ECOWAS shall support processes towards the restoration of political authority. Such support may include the preparation, organisation, monitoring and management of the electoral process, with the cooperation of relevant regional and international organisations. The restoration of political authority shall be undertaken at the same time as the development of respect for human rights, enhancement of the rule of law and the judiciary.”

It should be noted that ECOWAS’ military interventions in Liberia and Sierra Leone, through its Ceasefire Monitoring Group, ECOMOG, in the 1990s, were under different circumstances and at the behest of the beleaguered governments. Also, in 2016/2017, the deployment of Nigerian air assets and the preparation by Senegalese troops to march on the Gambia only followed the uncompromising position of then-President Yahya Jammeh, who rejected ECOWAS’ mediation, claiming victory in the December 2016 election, which he lost. In the end, Jammeh was exiled to Equatorial Guinea without any military confrontations.

Also, under the 1999 and 2001 Protocols, there are provisions for the deployment of good office missions, including military chiefs, Council of the Wise/Elders or appointment of a Chief Mediator. But ECOWAS leaders did not exhaust these non-kinetic alternatives before going for an aborted military option in Niger. Also, the imposition of travel and flight bans effectively foreclosed the possibility of interactions or negotiations with the coup leaders.

Similarly, Nigeria’s cut of electricity supply to Niger did not derive from any ECOWAS instruments.

Article 52 of the 1999 Protocol states that: “In accordance with Chapters VII and VIII of the United Nations Charter, ECOWAS shall inform the United Nations of any military intervention undertaken in pursuit of the objectives of this Mechanism,” but this was not the case on Niger.

The embarrassment from an unprecedented and unpopular decision for kinetic option in Niger, which fell through, has forced ECOWAS leaders into an uncomfortable situation, and their bending over backwards to placate the junta leaders - a strategy fraught with potential uncertainties and unsavoury consequences.

Most critically, the implementation of some decisions taken by the ECOWAS Council of Ministers at its extraordinary meeting in Accra, Ghana 22-23 May 2025, on the contingency arrangements for the departure of Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger (known as the Alliance of Sahel States, AES, could damage the integrity, unity and cohesion of the regional bloc irreparably, and hasten its further disintegration.

Article 91 of the ECOWAS Revised Treaty 1993 is unambiguous on the withdrawal of any member state from ECOWAS. Article 91.1 states clearly: “Any member State wishing to withdraw from the Community shall give to the Executive Secretary (President of the Commission) one year's notice in writing… At the expiration of this period, if such notice is not withdrawn, such a State shall cease to be a member of the Community.

91.2. During the period of one year… such a member State shall continue to comply with the provisions of this Treaty and shall remain bound to discharge its obligations under this Treaty.”

ECOWAS rules do not provide for “group withdrawal,” and following the precedent with Mauritania's withdrawal in 2000, there was no need for the ECOWAS Council of Ministers to reinvent the wheel, the way it did in Accra.

The junta leaders announced their countries’ withdrawal from ECOWAS “with immediate effect” in January 2024.

However, under the 1993 treaty, that withdrawal only became effective by January 2025, and acting on humanitarian grounds, ECOWAS granted its staff from the AES countries until September 2025 to leave with an additional three months’ pay until December 2025.

Yet, the Council at its Accra meeting decided to: 

a. ”adopt a two-phase disengagement process for the affected staff. The first phase will involve staff in Senior Professional positions… and all G-Staff from the three countries that are working at ECOWAS institutions to be relocated and will take effect at the end of September, based on termination letters already sent to the staff concerned. The (ECOWAS), Commission is given until the end of December 2025 to recruit staff to fill the resulting vacant positions. The second phase will involve P4 Staff and below and will be carried out on a case-by-case basis, taking into account the specific circumstances of the staff concerned, including age and the priority needs of the institutions.”

“On regional market and economic integration, the Council underscored that Free Movement and Economic matters are at the core of regional integration and deserve particular attention in discussing separation modalities with the exiting countries.

In a needless move to accommodate the AES countries, “(The) Council noted the existence of various legal frameworks which are the foundation of regional economic integration and directly affect Community citizens… stressed the need to ensure a collective approach to negotiations as a regional bloc based on existing regional instruments such as the Protocol on free movement of persons, the ECOWAS Trade Liberalisation Scheme and the Common External Tariff.”

Additionally, while it “reiterates the clarity, in the relevant provisions of the ECOWAS staff Regulations, that only nationals of ECOWAS member States are eligible for employment as staff members,” the Council still called for a “Review of the Staff Regulations to reflect current circumstances.”

The Council further authorised the ECOWAS Bank for Investment and Development (EBID), ”to continue with its commitments under ongoing projects in Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger. Still, the Council decided that EBID disengage with staff from the three Countries.”

To many analysts, these concessions are not only too many, but unwarranted and may come back to haunt ECOWAS and its aspirations for regional integration. The junta leaders have been unrepentant in denouncing ECOWAS and all that it stands for while portraying themselves as populist power grabbers determined to perpetuate themselves in the saddle.

ECOWAS should assert itself as a rule-based organisation. However, its dilemma is that for the past 10 to 12 years, the bloc has ignored or tolerated “constitutional and electoral coups, and human rights violations” by some of its leaders in blatant breach of its own rules. There are also some fifth columnists within, working against ECOWAS.

The Constitutional Convergence Principles under Article 1 of the 2001 Protocol stress among others:

- Separation of powers by the Executive, Legislative and Judiciary.

- Empowerment and strengthening of parliaments and guarantee of parliamentary immunity.

-  Independence of the Judiciary.

- Every accession to power must be made through free, fair and transparent elections.

-  Zero tolerance for power obtained or maintained by unconstitutional means, and,

- Popular participation in decision-making, strict adherence to democratic principles and decentralisation of power at all levels of governance.

Yet, in their inordinate quest to obtain or retain power at all costs, some ECOWAS leaders have trampled on the regional principles, while the Authority of Heads of State has rendered dormant or ineffectual the ECOWAS Commission and its management, which are supposed to coordinate the programmes and activities of the regional institutions.

As ECOWAS celebrates the 50th anniversary of its formation through the 28th May 1975 Treaty of Lagos, its drastic problems require drastic solutions.

For a start, the ECOWAS Commission should undertake an urgent and transparent recruitment exercise to fill any vacant positions from the teeming army of qualified professionals among the 400 million community citizens and release staff from countries whose leaders despise the regional bloc.

Since the proud junta leaders believe that their landlocked poor countries are self-sufficient, ECOWAS should not reward their arrogance.

To regain its past glory, navigate emerging threats and bequeath an enduring legacy to the next generations, ECOWAS leaders at national and regional levels must change tact and lead by example with vision and dynamism, beginning with effective management of the lingering threats in member States such as Togo, Guinea Bissau, Sierra Leone, The Gambia and Cote d’Ivoire. 

Paul Ejime is a Media/Communications Specialist and Global Affairs Analyst

The publisher of Ovation International, Dele Momodu, has claimed that his soul has left the Peoples Democratic Party, PDP.

Momodu stated this during an interview on the Broadcasting Corporation of Oyo State’s programme, on Tuesday.

The PDP chieftain bemoaned the division within the PDP, which, according to him, poses a serious challenge to the ruling party.

“My soul has left the PDP; it’s only my body that remains.

“If the PDP were united, it could defeat the APC in 2027.

“But too many forces within and outside are fighting against this.”

His comments come amid a deluge of defections from the PDP to the All Progressives Congress, APC.

Momodu added that, “the ruling party’s strategy is to weaken the opposition.”

[DailyPost]

The Minister of the Federal Capital Territory (FCT) Nyesom Wike on Tuesday renamed the Abuja International Conference Centre (AICC) after President Bola Tinubu.

While speaking at the commissioning of the edifice by the Tinubu in Abuja, Wike said the ‘Bola Ahmed Tinubu International Conference Centre’ is a world-class structure requiring constant maintenance.

He noted with the permission of the President that anybody that would use the newly renovated ICC must be made to pay irrespective of his or her status

Details shortly…

[TheNation]

Saudi Pro League side Al Hilal is reportedly negotiating a short-term loan deal to bring midfielder N’Golo Kanté from rivals Al Ittihad for the upcoming Club World Cup in the United States, according to transfer expert David Ornstein.

While no agreement has been finalised, there is growing optimism that a deal can be reached.

“Al Hilal are in talks to sign N’Golo Kanté on a short-term loan deal from fellow Saudi Pro League side Al Ittihad for the Club World Cup,” Ornstein reported. “An agreement has not yet been reached but there is optimism that a deal can be done.”

Both clubs are controlled by Saudi Arabia’s Public Investment Fund (PIF), which acquired Al Hilal, Al Ittihad, Al Nassr, and Al Ahli ahead of the 2023 summer transfer window.

Al Hilal earned their spot in the expanded Club World Cup as the 2021 AFC Champions League winners, making them the only Saudi representative at the tournament.

Kanté, 34, joined Al Ittihad on a free transfer from Chelsea in July 2023 and played a key role in their Saudi Pro League title-winning campaign last season, finishing eight points ahead of Al Hilal.

The French midfielder, who has made 81 appearances for Al Ittihad, previously starred at Chelsea, where he won the Premier League, Champions League, Europa League, and FA Cup across seven years and 269 appearances.

Kanté joined Chelsea from Leicester City for £30 million in 2016 after helping the Foxes secure their historic Premier League title.

Al Hilal, now led by former Inter Milan head coach Simone Inzaghi, boasts a squad featuring former European stars such as Rúben Neves, Aleksandar Mitrović, and Kanté’s ex-Chelsea teammate Kalidou Koulibaly.

The club will kick off their Club World Cup campaign against Real Madrid on June 18, followed by matches against Red Bull Salzburg on June 22 and Pachuca on June 26.

[Punch]

Since losing power in 2015, the Peoples Democratic Party (PDP) has shown little urgency in pursuing meaningful reform. Rebranding efforts have been scant, and there’s been no sincere attempt to convince Nigerians that its defeat was the result of 16 years of misrule and a widening disconnect from the people it once claimed to represent.

Only recently – following high-profile defections, including those of Delta State Governor Sheriff Oborevwori and his predecessor, Ifeanyi Okowa – did the PDP appear to grasp the gravity of its situation. As the party continues to lose more members, it has also begun trying to rebrand. While this signals a much-needed reawakening, it is far from enough.

In a previous article addressing this wave of defections, I argued that the PDP must rethink, regroup, and redefine its new role as Nigeria’s leading opposition. I outlined four reforms the party must pursue to rebuild trust and repair its damaged reputation among Nigerians.

First, the PDP must align its positions across national and grassroots levels. Second, it must end the imposition of candidates in favour of merit-based leadership. Third, the party should champion legal reforms to curb opportunistic defections. And fourth, it must invest in civic education campaigns that connect its values and governance vision with the aspirations of ordinary Nigerians. However, true reform must begin with sincere remorse.

Before embarking on these crucial reforms, the PDP must first acknowledge that it broke the trust of Nigerians, and failed the people during its 16 years in power. Without this, any reform would be seen as cosmetic, and driven by desperation, not accountability.

To navigate this critical moment, the party can take lessons from Africa’s various truth commissions such as South Africa’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission, Rwanda’s Gacaca courts, and Nigeria’s own Oputa Panel. One valuable insight they all share is this: real transformation begins with truth-telling and, where appropriate, an apology.

Apologies are not always spoken. Sometimes they are demonstrated through changed behaviour. Take the APC, for example. Ahead of the 2015 election, the party – aware that its candidate, Muhammadu Buhari, had the image of a former military dictator with a troubling human rights record – launched a rebranding campaign. It portrayed him as a “converted democrat.” This repositioning helped pave the way for the party’s eventual victory.

The PDP must understand that reform without remorse is simply branding. It should not assume that Nigerians, disillusioned by the APC’s many failures, will automatically return to the PDP by default. That would be a grave miscalculation by the party.

Indeed, the APC has proven to be far from the change it promised – and in many respects, arguably worse than the PDP. But this disappointment alone does not guarantee a PDP comeback. Not without reform. And certainly not without some form of atonement.

The PDP must be willing to engage in political truth-telling and demonstrate changed behaviour to Nigerians. This doesn’t require dramatic public confessions. What it does require is a clear, public acknowledgement that mistakes were made, that lessons have been learned, and that safeguards are now in place to ensure those mistakes are not repeated.

As I mentioned earlier, a reformed PDP must align its internal structures, end the imposition of candidates, champion anti-defection legislation, and invest in civic education that reflects a genuine commitment to Nigeria’s democratic aspirations.

Reputation, once lost, is difficult to regain – but not impossible. Truth commissions across Africa have shown us that forgiveness is possible when contrition is sincere. The PDP must embrace this lesson if it hopes to rebuild trust with Nigerians. Reform without contrition is just branding. What the PDP must offer is reform rooted in remorse, and not desperation.

● Maduekwe is the founder of Discussing Africa. He can be reached at This email address is being protected from spambots. You need JavaScript enabled to view it.

President Bola Tinubu has departed Lagos for Abuja, the nation’s capital, after a two-week stay.

The president was accompanied to the Lagos airport by Babajide Sanwo-Olu, governor of the state, on Tuesday afternoon.

More to follow…

[TheCable]

When Nyesom Wike, the often blunt and garrulous FCT Minister, warned that embassies in Abuja failing to pay ground rent could face sealing, one cannot but predict that his action could land Nigeria into a legal, and diplomatic quagmire. While at first glance this might seem a straightforward enforcement of property laws, the diplomatic fallout could be profound. From international law and bilateral relations to domestic politics and Nigeria’s long-term global image, the move sets several worrying precedents.

The reason for the foregoing anxiety cannot be farfetched as Nigeria, like many countries, offers embassies hallowed status as diplomatic missions are typically exempt from standard local regulation under the Vienna Convention. Yet, exceptions may exist when it comes to state‑negotiated lease terms. If Nigeria’s revenue service deems that embassies are obliged to pay ground rent negotiated in formal agreements, and those agreements clearly stipulate enforceable obligations, Wike’s move may be legally defensible.

But enforcing that rent, threatening embassy closure or asset seizure, is not just a commercial decision. It touches on diplomatic immunity and the sanctity of missions themselves. Under the Vienna Convention, diplomatic premises are inviolable. Nigeria could risk breaching that inviolability if enforcement appears coercive or forceful.

While listening to human rights lawyer and Senior Advocate of Nigeria (SAN), Femi Falan during an interview on Politics Today on Channels Television, his position on the issue was not just cautionary and weighty, but it was timely as it is a clear-eyed reminder that governance must operate within the bounds of legality and diplomacy, not impulsive theatrics.

Falana, on the programme, cautioned Wike, stressing that such actions risk triggering serious diplomatic backlash. He pointed to Article 22 of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, which explicitly states that embassy premises are inviolable. That means, no matter the level of provocation or debt, Nigeria has no legal right to forcibly enter, seal, or tamper with diplomatic premises. Any move to do so, Falana argued, would be unlawful and could embarrass Nigeria on the global stage.

Falana did not stop at the international implications; he also questioned the legality of Wike’s broader sealing-off tactics. According to him, the minister cannot unilaterally order such actions without first giving affected parties the right to fair hearing, as guaranteed by Section 36 of Nigeria’s Constitution and Article 7 of the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights Act. In short, bypassing legal processes to enforce rent payment amounts to executive rascality.

He urged the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Yusuf Tuggar, to immediately intervene, emphasizing that matters involving foreign missions require tact, protocol, and strict adherence to international law, not the strong-arm tactics Wike seems to prefer.

Be that as it may, it is expedient to opine that Wike’s threat is not without modern parallels. Around the world, similar disputes have escalated into flashpoints of diplomatic tension. For instance, in 2019, there was a standoff between India and Pakistan. As gathered from historical literatures, Pakistan locked down a building the Indian embassy had purchased earlier due to a payment dispute, prompting formal diplomatic protests and media coverage.

In a similar vein, there was diplomatic imbroglio between Russia and Georgia in London in 2006. As gathered, a rent dispute over a property adjacent to the Georgian embassy sparked a court battle and serious public disagreement, though both sides ultimately avoided drastic action.

Also in a similar vein, history has it that UK Embassy in Tehran in 1979 was embroiled In a crisis far more intense than transactional rent disputes as embassy powers were overridden, buildings occupied, leading to one of the gravest diplomatic crises of the modern era.

In even these tensions over property among friendly states, the fallout was real: formal complaints, tit-for-tat trade irritants, sometimes minor sanctions, or downgrading of diplomatic ties. Escalations like this do not stay confined to Assemblies, they bleed into broader relations, public image, security cooperation, and more.

On paper, cracking down on unpaid rent could portray Nigeria to be fiscally responsible, and a nation that is guided by rule-of-law. This is as the revenue climate is already austere, and every naira counts. Wike’s track record shows he does not shy from enforcing payments: earlier this year, he sealed off properties over tax arrears.

But embassies operate on a different diplomatic plane. If Abuja proceeds to seal or padlock foreign diplomatic missions, even temporarily, expect, retaliatory action. Other governments might retaliate by slowing or withholding visas, import licenses, or participation in agreements.

In fact, the diplomatic row may metamorphose to chilling foreign investment. Therefore, business leaders should take note, if Nigeria cannot manage to enforce dues for embassies, what might that imply for investors?

Not only that, future administrations may weaponize embassy vulnerability more overtly as rent could morph into leverage, particularly as there is a foundational precedent to stand on.

In light of the potential diplomatic fallout from Wike’s threat to seal embassies over unpaid ground rent, it is imperative that the Federal Government urgently calls the FCT Minister to order. Matters that border on diplomacy are not within the jurisdiction of state or regional officials, no matter their title or influence, they remain the exclusive preserve of the Federal Government, particularly the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

Wike, by all observations, is not known for his diplomatic finesse. His combative and often theatrical style of governance may have served him well in the political trenches of Rivers State, but in Abuja, Nigeria’s seat of power and international diplomacy, such recklessness could spell disaster. Allowing him to trample on long-established diplomatic norms and the inviolability of foreign missions, as enshrined in international conventions, could result in diplomatic reprisals, strained bilateral ties, and reputational damage for Nigeria on the global stage.

Before this needless drama escalates into an international embarrassment, the Federal Government must rein in Wike’s overreach and ensure that Nigeria’s foreign relations are handled with the caution, protocol, and maturity they deserve. There are lawful, civilized means of recovering debts, even from embassies. What is not acceptable is for one man to jeopardize decades of diplomatic goodwill in a bid to score populist points or flex political muscle.

Former Vice President Atiku Abubakar has stepped up efforts to rally support for a proposed opposition coalition ahead of the 2027 general elections, seeking the backing of key northern political leaders to strengthen the alliance.

In a recent private meeting, Atiku reportedly visited former National Security Adviser General Aliyu Gusau (rtd) and appealed to him to help persuade prominent northern politicians who have expressed scepticism about the coalition’s direction and motives.

“Atiku begged Aliyu Gusau to specifically speak to former Senate President David Mark, former Jigawa State governor Sule Lamido and ex-presidential aspirant and former governor of Kaduna State, Ahmed Makarfi,” a source familiar with the meeting disclosed. “These are northern leaders who have expressed scepticism about the Atiku/El-Rufai coalition and have distanced themselves from it,” the source added.

General Gusau, a retired military intelligence chief and one of Nigeria’s most influential political figures, has previously served as national security adviser to both Presidents Olusegun Obasanjo and Goodluck Jonathan. He remains a powerful force in the background of Nigerian politics.

Though initially unconvinced about the intent of the coalition, Gusau agreed to initiate contact with the three senior northern figures to understand their perspectives and possibly facilitate a path forward. A meeting has reportedly been scheduled for this weekend at his Abuja residence.

“The meeting is for them to discuss the motives and modalities for the coalition and see if it’s worth supporting,” a source close to the talks confirmed.

David Mark, Sule Lamido, and Ahmed Makarfi have all been courted, it is understood.

Mark is said to be particularly cautious due to what some describe as a lack of clarity in the coalition’s formation. Makarfi has remained silent on the matter, while Lamido has taken a more vocal stance.

Lamido recently declared that he would not participate in any PDP meeting unless the party sanctioned key members who had openly endorsed President Bola Tinubu for a second term. He specifically named the Minister of the Federal Capital Territory, Nyesom Wike, and former Benue State Governor, Samuel Ortom, as examples.

The proposed coalition is a joint effort by several prominent opposition figures, including Atiku Abubakar, Peter Obi, the Labour Party’s 2023 presidential candidate, and former Kaduna State Governor Nasir El-Rufai.

[Politics Nigeria]