This week, President Bola Tinubu set tongues wagging when he formally requested the approval of the National Assembly to secure a new wave of multi-currency loans amounting to approximately $23.5 billion, €2.265 billion, ¥15 billion, and N757.9 billion, as part of the country’s 2025-2026 external borrowing plan.

Already, a lot of citizens have expressed concerns that the country may be heading towards a debt trap, a situation in which its debt is difficult or impossible to repay, almost two decades after it achieved debt forgiveness from the Paris Club.

More worrying with this development is the fact that, at a time when the Central Bank of Nigeria’s (CBN) Governor, Olayemi Cardoso and his team are aggressively pursuing a tight monetary policy regime aimed at curbing inflation and stabilising the naira, the federal government’s push for fresh borrowing appears to contradict this policy direction. Such a move risks undermining the effectiveness of monetary tightening by injecting more liquidity into the economy through increased public spending, potentially fueling inflationary pressures, distorting market signals, and eroding investor confidence in the government’s fiscal discipline.

Precisely, the fresh proposed borrowing plan, spanning multiple international lenders and development institutions, marks one of the most ambitious external financing proposals of this administration to date and will certainly elevate the country’s existing debt stock.

As at December 31, 2024, Nigeria’s total public debt stood at N144.67 trillion, according to data from the Debt Management Office. This was a 48.58 per cent rise from the N97.34 trillion recorded by the country as at the end of 2023.

However, the Minister of Finance and Coordinating Minister of the Economy, Mr. Wale Edun, has dismissed widespread claims suggesting that the country plans to borrow $25 billion within one to two years, calling such impressions as totally erroneous and misleading. He explained that the actual borrowing plan for 2025 is $1.2 billion through the DMO and up to $2 billion via the multilateral borrowing programme. These, he said, are tied to specific projects and would be disbursed over time, not in a lump sum.

“The actual borrowing for each year is contained in the annual budget. In 2025, the external borrowing component is $1.23 billion, and it has not yet been drawn. This is planned for the second half of 2025. Also, the plan is for both the federal and several state governments across numerous geopolitical zones, including Abia, Bauchi, Borno, Gombe, Kaduna, Lagos, Niger, Oyo, Sokoto, and Yobe States.

“Importantly, it should be noted that the borrowing rolling plan does not equate to an automatic increase in the nation’s debt burden. The nature of the rolling plan means that borrowings are split over the period of the projects. For example, a large proportion of projects in the 2024 – 2026 rolling plan have multi-year draw downs of between five to seven years, which are project-tied loans,” the minister stated.

Despite Edun’s clarification, the general concern is that Nigeria’s debt profile has been rising at an alarming pace. While borrowing is not inherently bad, as many nations leverage debt to fund growth, what distinguishes Nigeria’s case is the absence of a clear, measurable impact over the years, which has heightened distrust between the citizens and public office holders.

Public trust is the currency of governance. When leaders borrow in the name of national development, the people expect transparency, accountability, and results. This erosion of public trust is multifaceted, stemming from a combination of perceived corruption, lack of transparency in governance, inconsistent policy implementation, and a general feeling among citizens that their welfare is not the primary focus of leadership.

When citizens witness vast sums being borrowed with little to show for it in terms of improved public services or economic opportunities, skepticism naturally takes root. The opaqueness surrounding how loans are secured, how funds are disbursed, and the accountability mechanisms in place further fuels this distrust.

For instance, a recent revelation by civic tech organisation, BudgIT Nigeria, that it uncovered over 11,000 projects worth N6.93 trillion inserted by the National Assembly in the 2025 budget underscores growing concerns about transparency and fiscal discipline.

BudgIT had described the development as a deeply entrenched culture of exploitation and abuse, led by top-ranking members of the National Assembly, which is another means of frittering borrowed public funds meant to support national development.

This lack of transparency creates a chasm between the government and the governed, making it increasingly difficult for authorities to garner public support for necessary, albeit sometimes painful, economic reforms.

Indeed, Nigeria is not the first nation to borrow, and won’t be the last. But what distinguishes successful economies is not the size of their debt, but the clarity of their vision and the trust of their people.

This, however, is the time for other civil society groups, just like BudgIT, and indeed the citizens, to wake up, stay vigilant, and demand full accountability from those in power. We must ask the right questions about public finance, scrutinise every line of the budget, and track every amount borrowed to support governance. If we fail to act now, these massive loans meant to improve lives as had been reported in the past, could quietly vanish into private pockets, fueling corruption instead of development.

By prioritising fiscal discipline, fostering transparency, and actively working to restore the faith of its citizens, Nigeria can unlock its immense potential and build a more prosperous and equitable future for its citizens.

In the absence of trust, even the most well-intentioned policies will be met with suspicion. Therefore, as the government considers another round of massive borrowing, it must also begin the hard work of rebuilding its trust deficit.

There is supposed to be a formidable coalition of powerful regional and national political forces working to upstage President Bola Ahmed Tinubu in 2027. But this coalition isn’t coalescing and appears to be crumbling before it has even had a chance to be formed. Three major reasons account for this.

The first reason is what I call the aspirational collision of the major movers of the coalition. By that, I mean the two major power blocs behind the coalition have irreconcilably divergent ideas about who should occupy the upper end of the ticket the coalition will produce.

PDP’s Atiku Abubakar basically wants a recreation of the 2019 electoral lineup. He would be the presidential candidate, and Labor Party’s Peter Obi would be the vice-presidential candidate. It is predicated on the assumption that Atiku Abubakar, by virtue of his primordial identity, will be a magnet for northern votes.

If he is the only prominent northern candidate in 2027, he will win both Muslim and Christian votes in the region, as northern Christians trust him more than any northern Muslim politician of his generation on account of his remarkable broadmindedness, though his close association with Nasir El-Rufai, widely regarded by many northern Christians as a crass, unremorseful Christophobe because of his past actions and utterances, undermines this appeal.

Peter Obi is supposed to bring the enthusiasm and votes he got from the 2023 presidential election to the coalition. However, it appears that although Peter Obi isn’t personally ill-disposed to being Atiku’s running mate again, his support base in the South would deplete considerably should he choose to play second fiddle to a northerner this time.

The dramatic rise in his political capital in 2023 was entirely the consequence of his being the only notable Southern Christian presidential candidate in the race. Plus, the prevalent sentiment in the South is that Muhammadu Buhari’s eight-year tenure was the North’s chance to rule. The next eight years from 2023 is the South’s turn.

If Obi were to accept being Atiku’s running mate, he would be seen by people in the South, including his native Southeast, as a betrayer, as a quisling, of the region. And that would mark the irretrievable diminution of his political capital.

Yet, it is unconstitutional for Atiku to be anybody’s running mate, having been a two-term vice president before. So, there is zero possibility of Atiku agreeing to be running mate to Obi, whom he brought to national limelight by choosing him as his running mate in 2019, against the recommendation of major players in the PDP at the time.

This is an unresolvable impasse. As much as the South justifiably thinks it is its turn to produce the president until 2031, the North has been unsuccessfully calling attention to the disadvantage it has suffered as a result of Umaru Musa Yar’Adua’s death, which prematurely returned power to the South for six years.

The Atiku group’s carrot to Obi—to accept being VP in exchange for Atiku serving only one term—is informed by this logic. It somehow compensates the North’s six-year loss and promises a return of power to the Southeast, which has never produced a president (or even a vice president) since the start of the Fourth Republic.

Nevertheless, if the chatter I see on social media is any guide, Obi’s support base is unpersuaded by this. Were Obi to accept being a running mate to Atiku in 2027, many Obi supporters say they would rather sit out the election or, worse, vote for Tinubu to ensure that the presidency remains in the South.

This is complicated by the reality that, were Atiku to stay out of the 2027 presidential contest and endorse Obi, it’s unlikely to improve Obi’s electoral fortunes in parts of the North that rejected him in 2023.

The second reason the coalition is unlikely to succeed is that key northern politicians who are already positioning themselves to be Tinubu’s successor in 2031 are either not part of it or are in it to undercut it from within. There are two reasons for this.

First, an Atiku presidency would mean their aspirations to be president would be deferred by more years than a Tinubu second term. Plus, even if Atiku honors his alleged pledge to serve for only one term (which is never a guarantee, given the intoxication of power), he would hand over power to the South. That counts them out.

Second, opposing Tinubu’s second term by joining a coalition would ensure that they take themselves out of consideration for Tinubu’s support in 2031. It is self-seeking political calculation that assumes the nature and form of the outlines of the future.

The third reason the coalition would have trouble taking off is Tinubu’s own determined, single-minded, well-oiled—even state-sanctioned—effort to destroy it. I’ll only talk about one effort because, while many people may be aware of it, only a few seem to be conscious of it.

Tinubu is deploying a political propaganda tactic called the bandwagon technique. This method encourages people to act or think a certain way because “everyone else is doing it.” It appeals to the human desire to be part of the majority or to avoid being left out.

It’s a powerful technique because it leverages social pressure and the fear of missing out (FOMO). The unceasing gale of political defections of prominent political actors across the country is intended to cause Tinubu’s opponents to question their judgement and give up their opposition to him.

Even Afrobeats music icon Davido—who won well-deserved plaudits and brownie points from Igbo people a few days ago for telling a Yoruba Twitter interlocutor who questioned his outward symbolic associations with Igbo that he is “Igbo by blood”—appears to be part of this bandwagon technique.

Video records of him visiting Tinubu in the Presidential Villa and introducing well-known Igbo entertainment figures as “APC members” fit the bandwagon method perfectly. Here’s a man whom the president’s media team had tackled vigorously for his criticism of Tinubu’s government, whose uncle is a PDP governor, and who publicly identifies with the Igbo (a core stronghold of opposition to Tinubu), now openly identifying with the president at the same time that major political players in opposition parties are switching to APC. That’s unlikely to be random.

When you add this to the predominant sentiment in Nigeria that incumbents don’t lose elections, even if they actually lose them (with the exception of Goodluck Jonathan), you are looking at a systematic, coordinated effort to construct the rhetoric of inevitability around Tinubu’s second term.

A coalition of politicians who don’t offer or promise anything different from Tinubu and who have irreconcilable asymmetries in their expectations of what the coalition should produce will have a hard time overcoming Tinubu’s strategies.

This is sad because, as I previously pointed out, the conditions in the country should preclude Tinubu from even being considered for a second term. A May 24, 2025, special report I read in Vanguard by Dr. Dele Sobowale titled “Tinubu at Midterm: Who are the People Gov’t is Satisfying?” was particularly striking.

Sobowale's Consultancy conducted a nationwide survey to assess public perception of the federal government's performance. The study involved a brief verbal questionnaire posed to Nigerians across all six geopolitical zones, cutting across age, ethnicity, religion, gender, and income levels.

Participants were asked two simple yes-or-no questions: whether their lives were better now compared to two years ago, and whether they expected things to improve in the next two years.

The findings were stark. Only 3 percent of respondents said their lives had improved, while an overwhelming 97 percent said they had not. Even more striking was the pessimism about the future: just 1 percent expressed hope for improvement in the next two years, while 99 percent did not.

These results reflect a deep sense of dissatisfaction and growing despair among the Nigerian populace. In a normal setting, no government that has enabled this much misery index and that is burdened by this heavy perceptual burden should even run for a second term. But this is Nigeria.

Yesterday’s light-hearted post about African English pronunciations using the example of how Nigerians, Kenyans, and Ghanaians say the word “work” sparked a spirited conversation about the supposed “correct” way to pronounce English words.

With my 8-year-old daughter, Ramat, during the last ed-el-fitr celebration

After reading through the comments, I’ve concluded that many, perhaps most, Nigerians have been conditioned (brainwashed might be the better word) by Ghanaian teachers who came to Nigeria in large numbers during the 1970s and 1980s to teach in primary and secondary schools.

 These teachers, whether consciously or not, often instilled the idea that Nigerian pronunciations were “wrong” or inferior to Ghanaian ones. That belief is deeply flawed.

Let’s begin with a fundamental truth: there is no universally “correct” or “incorrect” pronunciation in English. 

 Within England alone, pronunciation varies dramatically from region to region. The same holds true for the United States and every other native-English-speaking country.

 Every speech community adapts pronunciation to its own linguistic environment and sociocultural peculiarities.

Second, I’ve interacted with native English speakers from different countries for over two decades now, and I can confidently say that Ghanaian English pronunciation isn’t inherently closer to native English accents than Nigerian pronunciation is.

 Ghanaian English sounds Ghanaian. Nigerian English sounds Nigerian. That’s all there is to it.

It’s true that dictionaries provide phonetic transcriptions of words, and those who learn English formally often mistake these transcriptions for definitive pronunciation standards. 

But dictionaries merely offer approximations—often based on a narrow sliver of upper-class native speakers. 

The situation becomes even more complex when you consider the wide variation within native English dialects. What dictionaries present as “standard” is usually just the speech of society’s elites who are, ironically, a small minority even in their own countries.

Standard English pronunciation is not synonymous with the “correct” English pronunciation, just as non-standard varieties aren’t “incorrect.”

For example, take Received Pronunciation (RP), often called the King’s (or Queen’s) English or BBC English. Only about 2 to 3 percent of people in England speak with an RP accent. Some estimates stretch that to 5 or 10 percent, but even then, over 90 percent of Britons don’t speak RP. 

So, to call it the only “correct” accent simply because it’s represented in UK dictionaries or on broadcast media is to erase and belittle the speech patterns of the vast majority of English speakers in Britain.

In the United States, the General American (GenAm) accent is more widely used than RP is in the UK, with estimates suggesting that about 40 to 50 percent of Americans speak a variant of it.

Still, the U.S. is teeming with other recognizable accents: Southern, Bostonian, New York, Appalachian, Cajun, and many more.

This is precisely why pronunciation doesn’t factor into what is formally defined as Standard English. 

That said, I am not suggesting that you shouldn’t strive to pronounce words in ways that make you intelligible to the widest audience possible. Communicative clarity matters.

But let’s be honest: most English speakers around the world don’t pronounce work as “wek,” nurse as “nes,” or pastor as “pasta,” as Ghanaians do. 

In fact, calling a pastor “pasta” might earn you accusations of harboring cannibalistic fantasies. We eat pasta. Pastors preach the gospel. Big difference!

Amusingly, a few hours ago, when I asked my 8-year-old daughter (who has never traveled outside the United States) which of “wok,” “wak,” or “wek” sounded most like work, she picked “wok” without the slightest hesitation.

 I swear, she even echoed what our American “referee” said during a similar conversation more than 20 years ago: that “wak” reminds her of whack—as in, to hit someone!

If you listen carefully to English spoken across Anglophone Africa, you'll notice three unmistakable "accent capitals": Nigerian, Kenyan, and Ghanaian. 

All other regional accents tend to branch out as derivatives or close relatives of this linguistic trinity. And nothing illustrates these fascinating differences quite like the word "work."

In Nigeria, it is pronounced emphatically as "wok," with the "o" booming proudly like the first sound in "all." Nigerians will tell you they’re off to "wok" with seriousness befitting an epic quest. 

Over in Kenya, however, the word undergoes a curious transformation into "wak," perilously close to "whack," as though every job involves a bit of spirited combat. 

And then in Ghana, our little stubborn brother, the pronunciation elegantly morphs into "wek," cheerfully rhyming with "check." 

Back in June 2003, these accent disparities sparked an unforgettable showdown between me and my Kenyan journalist friend, Douglas Kimani, during our days together in the United States. 

Douglas cheekily declared that Nigerians were burdened with the absolute worst English accent on the African continent. To drive home his point, he challenged me, saying, "Pronounce 'work' for me."

"Wok," I said, with Nigerian flair. Douglas erupted into uncontrollable laughter, nearly toppling over. "You mean 'wak,' my friend!" he retorted confidently.

This was too much. I responded by doubling over in hysterical laughter myself. Offended yet amused, Douglas insisted we settle this pronunciational dispute fairly. 

We approached an unsuspecting American lady, explained our accents, spelled the word for clarity, and then performed our distinct pronunciations. "Who’s closer to your own pronunciation?" Douglas asked, triumphantly certain of victory.

Without hesitation, our American "referee" sided with me. She gently explained to Douglas that "wak" would sound to an American like "whack," meaning either to hit forcefully or, if spelled "wack," something bizarre or totally uncool. 

Douglas’s expression was priceless. It was a cocktail of disbelief, mock outrage, and good-humored defeat.

From that day on, our banter took a hilarious turn. Each time I saw Douglas, I’d tease, "So, my friend, how is wak in Kenya today?" and he would gamely respond in a wildly exaggerated Nigerian accent, "Ah, wok is perfectly fine o!"

Lately, whenever I recall our playful linguistic duels, my thoughts drift amusingly to Rihanna's global hit, "Work." 

Imagine if Rihanna had adopted the Kenyan pronunciation, singing passionately, "Wak, wak, wak, wak, wak, wak!" Her song would have transformed instantly into an anthem fit for a flock of quacking ducks!

Now, if you'll excuse me, it's time I got back to "wok." Or should I say "wak"…or "wek"?

I was one of the seven journalists invited to interview Gov. Umo Eno in Uyo on May 29 as part of his midterm anniversary activities. It was held at Akpan Isemin Hall in Government House and attended by the deputy governor, Senator Akon Eyakenyi; Secretary to the State Government, Enobong Uwah and several senior officials. The hall was packed with journalists and members of civil society organizations. Broadcast journalist Michael Bush moderated the interview while Mrs Mandu Essienobong (AKBC); Itoro Columba (Bridge TV); Oku Ekpenyong (NTA); Miriam Daniel (TVC); George Iniabasi Essien (Comfort FM) and I grilled the governor. It was an intense and wide-ranging two-and-a-half hour engagement and, undoubtedly, the most grueling interview session the governor has had since he assumed office. We asked about 20 questions on virtually every aspect of the administration’s blueprint. Only three questions were taken from the audience due to time constraint. Gov. Eno remained calm and spoke with passion and clarity of thought. He scored himself ‘’above 50%’’ when we asked him to evaluate his performance himself, but stressed that he would prefer to be assessed by the citizens.

The programme started at 2.45pm with a brief remark from the Commissioner for Information, Aniekan Umana, who stated that the event was an important media engagement through which the governor would speak to Akwa Ibom people across the world. I asked two questions on insecurity in our waterways and the true position of government’s finances. Gov. Eno explained steps taken to make our waters safer for travelers and fishermen, and noted that the government had ordered for two luxury boats that would convey passengers between Oron and Calabar, bringing back the glorious days of water transportation which we had in the 1070s. On the management of our finances, he said that he had created a savings account in which the government saves money every month. ‘’The state saves money and meets its contractual obligations on time. We have a cash flow plan that we follow’’, he said, noting that having been in business for over 25 years before his election, he has a good grasp of our to manage resources. He then launched into recent misleading press reports on the revenue of the government. An Uyo-based paper had reported that Akwa Ibom State earns N200 billion a month, a patently false claim based on the reporter’s misunderstanding of financial statements. The reporter had misinterpreted ‘’carried forward balance’’ in a financial report as an income line.

The governor noted that such an erroneous reporting usually creates unintended problems for the government as neighbouring states would assume that the enhanced revenue is earned from crude oil wells ceased from them. ‘’This particular misleading news story was very troubling as a governor of an oil-producing state was brandishing the newspaper in a meeting in Abuja, claiming that Akwa Ibom had ceased its oil wells and that’s why we are earning N200 billion in a month’’, the governor said.

He noted that he has no intention of gagging the press, but advised journalists to be more meticulous in covering government affairs, especially financial matters as many people depend on media reports to form impressions and pass judgments. I started my journalism career 37 years ago as a Finance Reporter in a national newspaper and I can confirm that interpreting and reporting financial data could pose a problem for some journalists. But I expect every journalist, even if he read History & Anthropology in the university, to know that a balance carried forward from a previous accounting period is not a fresh income. I am considering working with the NUJ to organize basic courses on financial analysis for the journalists in Akwa Ibom.

Michael Bush’s question on what have been the major surprises the governor has met in office also drew an interesting answer. The expectation from some people that government’s money should be shared to them has been a major shocker, the governor responded. ‘’There are some people, maybe among the youths, who just wake up every morning and monitor Government House gate to see the number of bullion vans coming in with cash to be shared to them’’, he said to the amusement of the audience. He advised the youths to make the best use of the various empowerment programmes to improve their skills and businesses.

Of all the 23 questions asked, there was only one that Eno refused to answer. When will he move to the APC? His looming defection has been a subject of discussions in the state among every section of the populace. It has seized the imagination of the citizens and divided opinions, but almost everybody has conceded that the internal crisis in the PDP could be a threat to a governor seeking reelection.

The State Chairman of the NUJ, Amos Etuk, who is leaving office in July after serving two terms, gave the vote of thanks. He commended the governor for supporting the media through many initiatives such as contributing to the building of the auditorium at the NUJ Secretariat; construction of a new headquarter building for the AKBC (the government-owned broadcaster) and planning to turn it into a cable TV.

Thank you for your thoughtful and passionate rejoinder to my commentary on the recent Court of Appeal judgment in Aguolu v. Aguolu (2025) LPELR-80269(CA). As a senior advocate of Nigeria and a student of justice, I believe in the power of dialogue, especially when it comes from citizens who are directly impacted by our legal system.

Let me start by assuring you that I fully recognize and appreciate the invisible contribution of homemakers like you. Indeed, your sacrifices, raising children, managing households, supporting spouses, and building homes with emotional and physical labour are fundamental to the institution of marriage and the health of society. You raise important questions. However, I believe there has been a fundamental misunderstanding of the position I put forward regarding matrimonial property settlement in Nigeria.

At no point did I dismiss or undervalue the contributions of full-time homemakers. Rather, I emphasized that Section 72 of the Matrimonial Causes Act (MCA) does not impose a rigid, automatic 50/50 formula, but instead gives the courts a discretionary power to decide what is “just and equitable”, taking into account both financial and non-financial contributions. That includes exactly the type of domestic and emotional labour that you and many women provide over the course of a marriage.

The false narrative that Nigerian courts disregard the work of homemakers is not supported by the law or its application. In Oghoyone v. Oghoyone (CA), for instance, the Court of Appeal, made it clear that contributions to the welfare of the family, whether monetary or not, are relevant and must be considered.

While the UK has indeed adopted a formula of 50/50 presumption in some cases, even their courts recognize exceptions based on need, contribution, and fairness. What I caution against is transplanting that model wholesale into the Nigerian context, where marriages vary widely in structure, contribution patterns, and economic dynamics.

More importantly, what is progressive is not necessarily what is rigidly equal, but what is contextually fair. A homemaker in a 20-year marriage may justly receive the house. A spouse in a two-year union without children or major joint efforts may not. This is why Nigerian courts examine the facts and circumstances of each case.

You expressed concern that discretion “often favours the man.” If that has happened in specific cases, then we must indeed critique enforcement, but not the principle. Judicial discretion allows for sensitivity to real-life nuances that a rigid rule may overlook.

The question should not be whether we apply a one-size-fits-all 50/50 rule, but rather whether our judges are trained, sensitized, and empowered to make equitable decisions. The Nigerian legal framework already provides room for justice for women. What we need is consistent application and fairness.

You mentioned the unfairness of women being expected to prove their worth when they have no financial documents. I agree that this is a challenge. However, legal practitioners, including my lecturers like Prof Dorcas Odunaike of Babcock, have long advocated for reforms in judicial procedure to better capture domestic and informal contributions of women like you

Courts are not blind to the reality that many women contribute informally to a spouse’s business or manage the home full-time. Testimonies, witness statements, and patterns of lifestyle are admissible in evidence. Where properly presented, they form the basis for equitable distribution.

Mrs. Ibrahim, your plea for justice is valid, and I support the evolution of our legal culture to be more responsive to the vulnerable. But evolution must be grounded in principled fairness, not emotional reaction or foreign imitation.

My advocacy is, and I think you should join, to advocate for:

Stronger judicial training on evaluating non-financial contributions.

Legal aid and access to justice for vulnerable spouses.

Better documentation practices in marriages.

Encouraging courts to speak more boldly in defending homemakers’ rights.

Conclusion

Our legal system, though imperfect, does not punish homemakers. Rather, it gives room for their voices to be heard when presented properly. The call, therefore, is not for a blind 50/50 rule but for a legal culture that ensures the full dignity of women like you is recognized and preserved.

Let us work together, lawyers, homemakers, and policymakers to build that culture.

With utmost respect, Ma'am.

Dr. Monday O. Ubani, SAN

As President Bola Ahmed Tinubu marks two years in office, a comprehensive mid-term assessment by the Civil Society Legislative Advocacy Centre (CISLAC), the Nigerian chapter of Transparency International, presents a complex picture of governance marked by reform ambitions intertwined with persistent challenges across Nigeria’s executive, legislative, and judicial branches. The report highlights an administration grappling with economic transformation and security management while facing increasing public dissatisfaction and democratic erosion.

Economically, the Tinubu administration has pursued bold reforms, including the removal of fuel subsidies and unification of exchange rates, which have won praise from international financial institutions. Nigeria’s foreign reserves have risen to over $37 billion, and foreign investment is tentatively returning. Yet for ordinary Nigerians, the harsh realities of these reforms have manifested in soaring inflation surpassing 33 percent, a doubling of food prices, and stagnant real wages. The absence of a comprehensive social safety net has exacerbated poverty and deepened the crisis of survival, exposing a dissonance between macroeconomic recovery indicators and everyday hardships experienced by the populace. This economic strain has contributed to widening inequality and heightened public discontent.

The government’s handling of civil liberties has drawn sharp criticism. The Tinubu administration’s response to increasing dissent has been heavy-handed, with crackdowns on protesters, including minors, and restrictions on peaceful assembly becoming commonplace. Despite constitutional protections for freedom of expression and assembly, the narrowing civic space signals a troubling drift toward authoritarianism. Security concerns are frequently cited as justification for repression, yet CISLAC warns this growing securitization of governance risks undermining fundamental democratic rights and weakening the nation’s social fabric.

Security remains one of the administration’s most daunting challenges. Despite expanded defense budgets and the creation of new security outfits like the Forest Security Service, violence persists across key regions, including Zamfara, Kaduna, Plateau, and parts of the South-East. Kidnappings, killings, and clashes have not abated, underscoring the limited impact of military deployments unsupported by effective intelligence reform. CISLAC advocates for a paradigm shift toward integrated security approaches emphasizing inter-agency collaboration, community policing, transparent procurement, and rebuilding public trust in law enforcement, which remain crucial for long-term peace and stability.

On anti-corruption efforts, the government has maintained some institutional mechanisms such as project tracking and procurement monitoring. The Independent Corrupt Practices Commission (ICPC) has monitored over 1,700 projects with some fund recoveries reported. However, the campaign is marred by selective enforcement, notably the failure to prosecute high-profile figures such as former Kogi Governor Yahaya Bello and the frequent defections of opposition politicians into the ruling party to avoid prosecution. This pattern has undermined the integrity of the anti-corruption drive and fed public cynicism about equal application of justice. CISLAC describes the campaign as weakened by double standards and stresses that impartiality is essential for meaningful progress.

The judiciary, as Nigeria’s third arm of government, faces persistent structural challenges despite commendable strides in filling judicial vacancies, digitalizing court processes, and ruling on electoral disputes. Backlogs, inconsistent verdicts, selective accountability, and executive interference have continued to erode public confidence in the justice system. The judiciary’s constitutional guarantees of financial and operational autonomy remain largely unrealized, with many state governments failing to domesticate critical laws such as the Administration of Criminal Justice Act. In a political climate characterized by increasing authoritarian tendencies and disregard for court orders, the judiciary’s independence is vital to safeguard civil liberties and uphold the rule of law. CISLAC warns that any further erosion of judicial impartiality risks accelerating impunity and democratic backsliding.

Agriculture, a vital sector for food security and employment, paints a similarly uneven picture. Despite the government’s declaration of a food emergency in 2023 and interventions like the “Earn from the Soil” initiative, over 31 million Nigerians remain food insecure, especially in conflict-affected zones. Budget allocations have not translated into commensurate agricultural output due to insecurity in farming regions, diversion of inputs, and inadequate access to credit and infrastructure. CISLAC emphasizes that without addressing land safety, rural development, and market access beyond seasonal handouts, sustainable food security will remain elusive.

The administration’s appointment pattern has also attracted criticism for lack of inclusivity and failure to uphold the federal character principle. Key positions have been filled with apparent regional bias, sidelining women and other marginalized groups. While competence is essential, appointments that disregard Nigeria’s ethnic, religious, gender, and generational diversity threaten national cohesion and unity, undermining the government’s broader stability agenda.

Employment and poverty continue to be critical concerns. Though the Student Loans Act signals some progress in educational financing, it falls short of addressing Nigeria’s structural unemployment and the escalating brain drain, popularly known as “Japa.” CISLAC contends that this exodus reflects economic despair rather than a lack of patriotism. The government must urgently focus on job creation, entrepreneurship, and industrialization to stem the loss of Nigerian talent and ensure sustainable development.

Social services remain underdeveloped despite increased budgetary allocations. Public education quality is deteriorating, and healthcare services remain largely inaccessible to the poor. Infrastructure improvements are largely symbolic, often lauded in press briefings rather than felt in everyday life. The national power grid remains unreliable, and rural electrification lags far behind expectations. CISLAC underscores that genuine progress must be measured by tangible improvements in citizens’ daily lives, not by superficial ceremonies or social media campaigns.

The 10th National Assembly, running concurrently with Tinubu’s administration, embodies both the promise and challenges of Nigeria’s democracy. The legislature plays a critical role not only as a lawmaking body but also as a forum for representation, checks and balances, policy scrutiny, and accountability. During this period, the Assembly has recorded some legislative activism, passing key bills, engaging constitutional amendments, and establishing committees to tackle national concerns. Notable efforts to enhance public participation and electoral reforms have been undertaken, along with oversight of security and economic challenges.

Yet, the Assembly’s record is marred by political dysfunction, including internal controversies, suspensions of members, allegations of executive interference, legislative gridlock, and defections that weaken democratic accountability. The failure to decisively address major national issues such as insecurity, corruption, and youth unemployment reveals a troubling disconnect between lawmakers and citizen expectations. The suspension of Senator Natasha Akpoti-Uduaghan, and the apparent weaponization of legislative privileges, have raised questions about the Assembly’s commitment to fairness and democratic norms. These actions risk undermining the constitutional guarantees of representation and free speech.

Moreover, the legislature has often shown insufficient independence from the executive branch. Oversight of critical policies has been tepid, responses to emergency declarations have been muted, and resistance to centralization of power remains weak. The House of Representatives, despite passing numerous bills, has sometimes failed to secure complementary Senate action, leading to legislative paralysis that stalls national progress. Issues such as land racketeering and informal taxation in Abuja’s Federal Capital Territory expose governance gaps that legislative committees have yet to fully address.

Political defections motivated more by personal survival than ideology further erode public trust and weaken party systems, deepening democratic fragility. Despite these setbacks, the 10th National Assembly still holds the potential to reassert its mandate through bold legislative action, robust oversight, and constitutional reform. This midterm review serves as a call for lawmakers to prioritize national interest above partisan or personal ambitions and to renew their commitment to the Constitution and the Nigerian people.

In this delicate democratic moment, the judiciary’s role is paramount. It must recommit to independence, impartiality, and the rule of law to serve as the final safeguard of democracy. Courts should be sanctuaries of justice, free from political manipulation, ensuring that citizens’ rights are protected, and that the government remains accountable.

CISLAC’s mid-term report concludes that while President Tinubu has initiated important reforms aimed at economic stability and governance, the administration’s overall performance is undermined by implementation gaps, rising authoritarianism, and insufficient empathy for citizens’ hardships. The Centre urges a shift toward people-centered policies, including increasing the minimum wage, comprehensive judicial and security sector reforms, equitable anti-corruption enforcement, and renewed investments in agriculture, infrastructure, and social services.

The next two years present a critical window for Nigeria to recalibrate its governance trajectory. Only through strengthened democratic institutions, transparency, and inclusion can the administration restore public trust and deliver on the promise of a prosperous and unified Nigeria. For civil society, media, and citizens, the challenge is to sustain engagement and pressure to ensure accountability and a government that truly serves its people.

Signed:

Comrade Auwal Musa Rafsanjani

Executive Director,

Civil Society Legislative Advocacy Centre (CISLAC)

The Governor of Anambra State, Professor Chukwuma Charles Soludo, CFR, has expressed very dear congratulations to His Excellency, Prince Dapo Abiodun, MFR, CON, Governor of Ogun State and Chairman of the Southern Governors Forum, on the occasion of his 65th birthday.

In his congratulatory message, Governor Soludo hailed Governor Abiodun’s remarkable contributions to the governance and development of Ogun State and the Southern Nigeria region. 

Governor Soludo noted that the leadership, patriotism, and dedication of Governor Abiodun have been inspiring, fostering unity and progress within the region and across Nigeria 

Governor Soludo also affirmed that as the deputy chairman in the Southern Governors' Forum, he has witnessed firsthand Governor Abiodun’s untiring resolve and collaborative spirit, which embody the essence of true leadership.

Thus, Governor Soludo celebrates this momentous occasion with his brother Governor, and prays for his continued strength, good health, and more wisdom to navigate the challenges ahead in driving progress and prosperity for our people and the entire nation.

Signed,

Christian Aburime

Press Secretary to the Governor

As the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) commemorates its 50th anniversary in 2025, the moment calls for both celebration and sober reflection. Founded on May 28, 1975, with the lofty vision of regional integration, economic cooperation, and collective security, ECOWAS was conceived as a panacea to the socio-political and economic woes of West Africa. Half a century later, the regional bloc finds itself navigating one of the most turbulent chapters in its history.

The recent exit of three key member states, Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger, on January 29, 2025, has cast a long shadow over the golden jubilee celebrations. Their withdrawal, following prolonged tensions between the ECOWAS leadership and these military-led governments, underscores the fragility of the union and raises uncomfortable questions about its relevance, resilience, and roadmap for the future.

To understand the gravity of the current crisis, one must examine the journey so far. Over five decades, ECOWAS has made commendable strides. It has established a free trade area and a common market, created institutions like the ECOWAS Court of Justice and the ECOWAS Parliament, and played pivotal roles in peacekeeping missions across the sub-region, including in Liberia, Sierra Leone, and The Gambia.

The protocol on free movement of persons, goods, and services remains one of ECOWAS’s most celebrated achievements. It has empowered millions of West Africans to live and work across borders, enriching the socio-cultural and economic tapestry of the region. The ECOWAS Passport is symbolic of a shared regional identity, an ambitious dream of African unity long before the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) was even conceived.

However, these gains have often been undermined by internal contradictions. ECOWAS has struggled with inconsistency in enforcing democratic norms, a weak response to human rights violations, and a perceived overreach in the internal affairs of sovereign states. Accusations of elitism and disconnect from the grassroots have further dented its image.

The withdrawal of Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger, now united under the Alliance of Sahel States (AES), is not just a protest. It is a political earthquake. These countries, each governed by military juntas, cited a lack of support, respect, and solidarity from ECOWAS. They argued that rather than being assisted during their moment of transition, they were sanctioned and isolated, pushing them into an alternative regional alignment.

Critics of ECOWAS argue that its knee-jerk reaction to coups often lacks nuance. By swiftly imposing sanctions, the bloc inadvertently punishes already suffering populations and drives these states further into geopolitical alternatives like Russia and China, which offer strategic partnerships without lectures on democracy.

To many observers, the exit of these three states is not just about juntas versus democracy. It is about a deeper crisis of confidence in ECOWAS. A significant portion of the populations in these countries support their military regimes, not because they reject democracy, but because they see the previous civilian governments, often backed by ECOWAS, as corrupt, ineffective, and out of touch.

At this juncture, it is expedient to conjecture that the future of ECOWAS rest on three likely scenarios that cut across fragmentation and irrelevance, reform and reinvention coupled with coexistence and competition.

Explanatorily put, if the current trend of disunity persists, ECOWAS risks becoming a toothless bulldog, an institution with grand pronouncements but little influence. More member states could align with the Sahel bloc or choose to drift toward nationalistic isolation. Without trust and unity, the core idea of regional integration collapses.

In a similar vein, the current crisis could become a catalyst for radical introspection and reform. ECOWAS must re-examine its governance structures, sanction mechanisms, and methods of engagement. Instead of isolating errant members, a dialogue-based, inclusive approach should be prioritized. The bloc must also reform to reflect grassroots concerns, not just the interests of heads of state.

Also, a more realistic scenario may involve ECOWAS continuing to exist alongside alternative regional alliances like the AES. In such a configuration, competition may spur institutional reforms and efficiency. However, it could also lead to policy conflicts, trade barriers, and duplicated efforts, hardly ideal for a region already grappling with poverty, insecurity, and underdevelopment.

Given the backdrop of the foregoing likelihoods, it is germane to ask, “What must be done?” The answer cannot be farfetched as there is no denying the fact that for ECOWAS to survive and remain relevant beyond its golden jubilee, it must adopt a bold, new mindset.

In a similar vein, there is an urgent need to put the people first within the scheme of ECOWAS. This is as the real strength of ECOWAS lies not in presidential palaces or summit resolutions but in the people of West Africa. Therefore, policies must reflect their needs that cut across jobs, security, education, health, and dignity. To achieve the foregoing objectives, the language of sanctions must give way to solutions.

Also, there is the need for the embracement of multipolar engagement. In fact, ECOWAS must accept that the days of sole Western alignment are over. Its member states, especially in the Sahel, are exploring relations with China, Russia, Turkey, and others. ECOWAS should play a facilitative role, not a gatekeeping one.

In fact, after the Golden Jubilee, the leadership of ECOWAS should embark on strengthening institutions, rather than strengthening individuals. Too often, ECOWAS has been hijacked by a few dominant leaders. Again, its institutions, parliament, court, commission, must be strengthened to act independently, with transparency and accountability.

In fact, there is an urgent need for the tackling of insecurity as a regional challenge. Terrorism, banditry, and organized crime are no longer national problems. They crisscross borders and demand a coordinated regional response. The AES nations’ frustration partly stems from a perception that ECOWAS abandoned them in their darkest hours.

Without a doubt, fifty years is a milestone worthy of celebration, but ECOWAS cannot afford to be lost in nostalgia. The anniversary must be a moment of reckoning. It must ask the tough questions: Is ECOWAS still a “community” in the true sense of the word? Can it evolve beyond being a club of presidents into a union of people? Will it take the exit of three sovereign states as a wake-up call or dismiss it as political noise?

The future of ECOWAS depends on what it chooses to become in this critical moment. West Africa is at a crossroads. Unity is no longer guaranteed, but neither is disintegration. What remains certain is that a reinvented, inclusive, and responsive ECOWAS is not only possible, it is urgently necessary.